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Fitch’s paradox of knowability was first presented in Fitch 1963 and it is 
alleged to have serious implications for the realism/anti-realism dispute.1 As 
a result of its importance for that issue, it has been the object of 
considerable, complex, and often heated debate. The paradox is fairly 
simple to grasp, however, and it is supposed to arise as follows. First, let us 
introduce an epistemic operator Kp that means very specifically that p is 
known by someone at some time. Suppose, then, that all truths are 
knowable by someone at sometime, and let us call the following principle 
the knowability principle: 
(KP) ∀p(p → ◊Kp). 
Suppose then also that we are not omniscient and let us refer to this 
principle as the non-omniscience principle: 
(NOP) ∃p(p ● ¬Kp). 
NOP then directly implies the following formula: 
(F1) p ● ¬Kp. 
Moreover, we can construct the following substitution instance of KP by 
inserting F1 for p in KP, thus yielding: 
(F2) (p ● ¬Kp) → ◊K(p ● ¬Kp). 
Since it is clearly possible to know F1, we get: 
(F3) ◊K(p ● ¬Kp). 
However, it is supposed to be easy to see then also that: 
(F4) ¬◊K(p ● ¬Kp). 
                                                             





F4 is supposed to follow from the following principles of epistemic and 
modal logic: 
(CON) K(p ● q)├ (Kp ● Kq). 
(K-ELIM) Kp├ p. 
(NEC-INT) If├ p, then □p 
(MOD) □¬p├ ¬◊p. 
The proof of this is as follows: 
(1) K(p ● ¬Kp)        [assumption]. 
(2) Kp ● K¬Kp        [CON, 1]. 
(3) Kp ● ¬Kp           [K-ELIM, 2].
(4) ¬K(p ● ¬Kp)     [Reductio, 1-3]. 
(5) □¬K(p ● ¬Kp)   [NEC-INT, 4].
(6) ¬◊K(p ● ¬Kp)      [MOD, 5]. 
Thus we appear to have generated a contradiction in deriving F3 and F4. 
So, by reductio, and if one wants to maintain KP, then one must deny NOP. 
This amounts to the acceptance of: 
(OP) ∀p(p → Kp). 
So every truth is supposed to be known. But this seems wildly paradoxical. 
It seems to be fairly obvious–almost a truism–that there might be unknown 
truths, and so something seems to be wrong here. But what exactly is wrong 
with the reasoning that leads to Fitch’s conclusion? It is not at all clear and 
many complex solutions have been proposed to Fitch’s paradox, but they 
are all controversial in one way or another.2 For example, some responses 
involve restricting KP in various ways and others involve the introduction 
of intuitionistic logic.3 The view to be defended here is simpler and it is 
based on the contention that the knowability paradox isn’t a paradox 
because the derivation of the paradox is faulty.4 So I suggest that the 
complex and often heated debate about how best to respond to the paradox 
is an unnecessary muddle. This is explained by showing that the K operator 
employed in generating the paradox is used equivocally and when the 
equivocation is eliminated, the derivation of F4 fails. 
The standard accounts of epistemic logic treat the K operator as 
analogous to the □ operator of alethic modality. Moreover, any such logic 
for the K operator that is at least as strong as the modal system K has K-
                                                             
2 See, Salerno (2009) and Kvanvig (2006). 
3 See, for example, Eddington (1985) and Dummett (2001). 
4 Williamson (1992, 2000) also claims that Fitch’s paradox is not a paradox, but for 
different reasons. 
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ELIM as an axiom.5 Of course, typical   accounts of the logic of the K 
operator involve epistemic analogs of the axioms of S4, and so standard 
epistemic logic has K-ELIM as an axiom. The problem that arises then in 
the derivation of F4 is that the K operator introduced in KP and NOP treats 
Kp as meaning that p is known by someone at sometime. However, as we 
shall see, on that reading the K operator appears to behave more like the ◊ 
of alethic modality than the □ of alethic modality. It is then deeply 
problematic to assume that the axioms of S4 (or even of the modal system 
K) apply to the K operator so understood. Specifically, the derivation of F4 
requires that the K operator obey K-ELIM in order to generate the 
contradiction that leads to OP, but as we shall see momentarily, the specific 
K operator used in KP and NOP does not seem to obey this axiom.6 K-
ELIM is of course an analog of □-ELIM in modal logic: 
(□-ELIM) □p├ p. 
In alethic logic □-ELIM makes sense because □p essentially asserts that if p 
is true in all possible worlds, p is true simpliciter because it is true at any 
given world. K-ELIM appears to assert that if p is known, p is true. This is 
often called factivity. But factivity is importantly ambiguous as it might be 
applied to the K operator used in generating Fitch’s paradox. We can read it 
as a close analog of □-ELIM and take it to assert something like the claim 
that for any world and any proposition, if p is known by someone at some 
time at that world, then p is true unrestrictedly (i.e. at any given world). 
Symbolically, this can be rendered as follows: 
(Factivity-1) ∀w∀p∃s∃tKwstp├ p. 
However, this is not the reading of K that best fits the concept of knowledge 
used in generating the knowability paradox, and it is obviously 
unacceptable. To render K more sensible and to capture the modally 
pregnant sense of knowability used in generating the paradox, K needs to 
be indexed to a world so that it asserts that if p is known at world w1, then p 
is true at w1 (and those worlds that are epistemically accessible from w1).
7 
But on this reading it simply does not follow from the fact that p is known 
in some world, that it is true at all worlds. This is the case because it is 
                                                             
5 See Mayer (2001). 
6 Kvanvig briefly considers this type of strategy in chapter 4 of his 2006, but he 
takes the strategy to be the denial of factivity for the knowledge operator. It will be 
suggested here that denying K-ELIM need not amount to the rejection of the factivity 
condition for knowledge. 
7 See Brogaard and Salerno 2007 for a more complex world indexing strategy based 




possible that p is only contingently true. Symbolically, the idea that 
someone knows that p at some time is better understood to obey the 
following principle: 
(Factivity-2) ∀w∀p∃s∃tKwstp├ p is true at w and at every 
world accessible from w. 
Suitably understood this is just the principle we need: for every proposition 
p and world w, if p is known by someone at some time at w, then p is true at 
that world and those worlds that are epistemically accessible from w1. 
To see the important implications of factivity-2, consider the following 
basic model theory for standard epistemic logic. Let W be a set of worlds 
such that each wi ∈ W, and R be the relation of epistemic possibility 
relating worlds. <W, R> is then a Kripke frame in the usual sense and 
propositions will be subsets of W such that p is true in w if and only if w ∈ 
p. Let R(w) be defined as follows: R(w) = {x ∈ W: Rwx}. Then p is known 
if and only if p follows from R(w). In other words, p is known at wi if and 
only if p is true in all worlds that are epistemically accessible from wi. 
Notice then that p can be known in this sense while being false at some 
worlds, and that factivity really can’t mean anything more than that if Kp is 
true at w1, then p is true at w1 and all worlds epistemically accessible from 
w1. That this is so is virtually trivial to see. More importantly, this structure 
shows more clearly what factivity-2 asserts. More precisely, factivity-2 can 
then be understood as follows: 
(Factivity-2) ∀w∀p∃s∃tKwstp├ p is true for R(w) ⊆ p. 
According to factivity-2, if p is known at a world w1, then p is only true at 
that world and those worlds that are epistemically accessible from w1. But, 
from this it does not follow that p is true unrestrictedly, i.e. in every model, 
as is the case with the corresponding alethic principle. 
What is then crucially important for Fitch’s alleged paradox is that the 
reading of K used in KP and NOP obeys factivity-2, and so K-ELIM needs 
to be understood in this way. In KP and NOP, K is used to indicate that 
there is some possible world where p is known by someone at sometime. It 
would be blatantly silly to read the K operator as asserting that p is known 
by someone at some time in every world, and this is because some truths 
are obviously not known by someone in some worlds at some times. It is 
easy to construct arbitrary maximal and consistent state descriptions where 
there is at least one unknown truth and so many such scenarios are possible. 
Let us then introduce subscripts to make the different uses of K clear. In KP 
and NOP, KFp (Fitch knowledge) is used and it asserts the modally infused 
notion that p is known by someone at sometime–understood to mean that 
there is a possible world where p is known by someone at some time, 
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whereas in standard epistemic logic we have KSp (standard knowledge), 
understood as simply asserting that p is known without any world indexing. 
The supposed generation of the paradox can then be suitably clarified as 
follows by making the distinction between the two concepts of knowledge 
explicit: 
(KPʹ) ∀p(p → ◊KFp). 
Again, we can then also suppose that we are not omniscient and introduce: 
(NOPʹ) ∃p(p ● ¬KFp). 
NOP then still implies the following formula: 
(F1ʹ) p ●¬KFp. 
We can then construct the following substitution instance of KP in the same 
way as before yielding: 
(F2ʹ) (p ● ¬KFp) → ◊KF(p ● ¬KFp). 
Again, since it is possible to know F1ʹ, we get: 
(F3ʹ) ◊KF(p ● ¬KFp). 
However, importantly, we now have: 
(F4ʹ) ¬◊KS(p ● ¬KSp). 
Here F4 follows from the following clarified principles of epistemic and 
modal logic: 
(CONʹ) KS(p ● q) ├ (KSp ● KSq). 
(K-ELIMʹ) KSp├ p. 
(NEC-INTʹ) If├ p, then □p 
(MODʹ) □¬p├ ¬◊ p. 
We are then supposed to conclude that, 
(OPʹ) ∀p(p → KFp). 
The problem now, however, is that in this case there is no contradiction. 
The conjunction of F3ʹ and F4ʹ is not a contradiction and the paradox does 
not arise because of the equivocation on K. It might however be supposed 
that the paradox can be restored by replacing the standard K operator with 
Fitch’s K operator in CONʹ and K-ELIMʹ, and thereby doing the same in 
F4ʹ as follows: 
(F4ʹʹ) ¬◊KF(p ● ¬KFp). 
(CONʹʹ) KF(p ●q)├ (KFp ● KFq). 




However, this will not work because it is easy to see that KFp as it is 
understood more clearly does not obey a standard K-ELIM axiom and the 
step from (2) to (3) fails. We cannot validly derive the unrestricted truth of 
¬Kp from K¬Kp. All that follows from K¬Kp given the sort of factivity-
2 understanding of K-ELIMʹʹ is that ¬Kp is true at the world we are 
indexing to and at those worlds that are accessible from that index world. 
So, as noted at the outset and as more clearly understood in terms of the 
model theory introduced above, KFp appears to behave much more like a ◊ 
operator in some important respects, and the following sort of principle is 
manifestly false for the ◊ operator:  
(◊-ELIM) ◊p├ p. 
The truth of p does not follow from its mere possibility. By the same token, 
the truth of p does not follow from its mere knowability. So the same 
problem arises for KFp and this is similarly easy to see. If we accept that 
KFp means that there is a world in which someone knows p at some time, 
then that p is true at all worlds does not follow from KFp. It only follows 
that (where p is contingent) p is true at the world where p is known in the 
Fitch sense and at worlds that are epistemically accessible from that world.8 
So the proposition p may be unknown and false in some or all other worlds. 
Thus F4ʹʹ cannot be soundly derived from CONʹʹ and K-ELIMʹʹ. This shows 
that there is in fact no paradox here at all. The perception that Fitch’s 
paradox is paradoxical is only an appearance, and it is based on a 
fundamental equivocation on the concept of knowledge and a fundamental 
ambiguity in the understanding of the factivity condition on knowledge. 
Since there is no paradox, there is no need for the sorts of elaborate and 
controversial solutions that are currently extant in the literature on 
knowability. 
                                                             
8 Incidentally, when we read the K operator in the Fitch sense NOPʹ turns out to be 
false. Recall that it is rendered as follows: (NOPʹ) ∃p(p ● ¬KFp). But if KFp means 
that someone in some possible world knows p at some time, then NOPʹ is false. There 
will always be a world where, for any true p, p is known, although at any given world p 
may not be known. This principle fails for much the same reason that K-ELIM fails for 
KFp. This is because the K operator so understood has implicit modal content that is 
much like alethic possibility. While it is true that we are not omniscient when 
understood relative to the actual world, this is not incompatible with the idea that every 
proposition is known by someone at some world or other. The omniscience principle is 
as follows: (OP) ∀p(p→ Kp). So we can see that OP is true for Fitch knowledge and 
given what has just been said this is obviously true. 
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